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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of the diffusion of a General Purpose Technology (GPT) that
spreads first within the developed North country of its origin, and then to a developing South
country. In the developed general equilibrium growth model, each final good can be produced
by one of two technologies. Each technology is characterized by a specific labor complemented
by a specific set of intermediate goods, which are enhanced periodically by Schumpeterian
R&D activities. When quality reaches a threshold level, a GPT arises in one of the technologies
and spreads first to the other technology within the North. Then, it propagates to the South,
following a similar sequence. Since diffusion is not even, neither intra- nor inter-country, the
GPT produces successive changes in the direction of technological knowledge and in inter- and
intra-country wage inequality. Through this mechanism the different observed paths of wage
inequality can be accommodated.
Keywords: North-South, general purpose technology, direction of technological knowledge,
wage inequality
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I. Introduction
Innovations of the general purpose technology (GPT) type ̶ defined as innovations that
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have large, extensive and prolonged impacts on the economy, such as steam-engine, electricity
and computers ̶ typically take a long time to have a significant impact in the aggregate
economy, as David (1990) documents for industrialized countries. Arguably, it takes even
longer for the GPT to spread to developing countries, due to lower levels of technological
knowledge. Therefore, this is certainly a case in which the process of GPT diffusion
(transitional dynamics) is at least as relevant as its steady-state effects. In particular, wage
inequality effects of technological change ̶ that have been receiving ample analytical attention
by authors such as Acemoglu (2002) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) ̶ generated
throughout the long process are likely to play an important role in the GPT diffusion.
Major contributions to the literature on GPT using general equilibrium models (e. g.,
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg,1995; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998; Petsas, 2003) have not dealt
neither with international diffusion nor with wage inequality consequences, since they typically
consider a closed-economy framework with a simplified productive structure with a single
aggregate good and homogeneous labor. This paper extends the scope of the analysis by
studying the wage-inequality effects of the diffusion of a GPT that spreads first within the
developed country of its origin (North), and then to a developing country (South).
A general equilibrium model of Schumpeterian R&D with final goods produced by two
substitute technologies is proposed. Each technology is characterized by a specific set of
intermediate goods complemented by a specific labor ̶ low- and high-skilled. The quality of
intermediate goods is enhanced periodically in the North by innovations. When quality reaches
a threshold level, a GPT arises in one of the technologies and spreads first to the other within
the North. Then, it propagates to the South, following a similar sequence. Diffusion to the
South, in the context of international trade of intermediate goods that embody technological
knowledge, is achieved through imitative R&D.
In our framework the distinctive characteristic of the GPT innovation is its capacity of
raising not only the productivity of the technology in which it has been generated, but also
aggregate productivity in successive phases of the diffusion process. In this sense, the GPT
works like an institutional improvement that permanently increases productivity. The role of
institutional change in explaining changes in wage inequality has been stressed by Aghion et al.
(2003). Thus, the analysis of the wage-inequality effects of the GPT, as defined in our
framework, links the institutional explanation to the more common ones (see also Aghion et al.,
2003) related to technological change (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002) and to international trade (e.g.,
Wood, 1998). Through this link, the historical reality of the wage-inequality path in many
developed and developing countries can be particularly accommodated.
The differentiated phases of the direction of technological knowledge, following the
emergence of the GPT, determine different phases for the relative demand for each type of
labor and, consequently, for the relative wage in both type of countries.
Many authors emphasize the causal relationship between the introduction (and diffusion) of
a new GPT and the distribution of wages. For example, empirical evidence puts forward an
increase in the skill premium in developed and developing countries during the 1980s and the
early 1990s,
1
due to the introduction of computers (a new GPT). The title of Kruegerʼs (1993)
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1 For example, Machin and Van Reenen (1998) highlight the increase of the skill premium in the United States, the
United Kingdom and Sweden between 1973 and 1989. The same path of the skill premium is illustrated by Berman et
al. (1998) for ten developed economies during the 1980s.
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paper on computers and wage inequality highlights this point of view: “How computers have
changed the wage structure.” The same idea is shared by Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997)
and Caselli (1999). These authors draw attention to the occurrence of “technological
revolutions” due to a “ third industrial revolution”, which have positively affected the skill
premium. Moreover, empirical evidence also indicates a decrease in the late 1990 and the early
2000s,
2
due to the end of the diffusion process.3
Earlier episodes in the twentieth century also support the view that the introduction of
GPT innovations favor skilled workers. For example, concerning the 1910s, Goldin and Katz
(1998, p. 695) argue that “ the switch to electricity from steam and water-power energy sources
was reinforcing because it reduced the demand for unskilled manual workers” . From the
experience of the 1920s, Jerome (1934) considers that there is considerable reason to believe
that radical (GPT) innovations raise the average skill required in the future.
In a scenario with lower openness to international trade and thus of greater independence
among countries,
4
our framework also provides an explanation for the skill-replacing
technological knowledge of the early nineteenth century in Britain (North country). In fact, the
skill-replacing developments in English cities were dominated by the large increase in the
supply of low-skilled labor, resulting from migration from villages and Ireland (e.g., Habakkuk,
1962; Bairoch, 1988; Williamson, 1990), which made the introduction of these technologies
profitable. Thus, contemporary historians (e.g., quotations made by Habakkuk, 1962) considered
the incentive to replace high-skilled artisans by low-skilled workers to be a major objective of
technological-knowledge improvements of the period. In a context of our mechanism, by
considering complementarity between inputs and substitutability between technologies in
production, the increase in supply of low-skilled labor will have dominated the effect of the
introduction (and diffusion) of new GPTs in production. As a result, the direction of
technological knowledge has become skill replacing.
Thus, unlike the current main explanations for the path of wages, which, ceteris paribus,
are unable to accommodate all the above occurrences, our framework is very flexible. The
technological explanation (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002) relies on the market size, i. e., the observed
high-skilled labor supply drives the direction of technological knowledge and wage inequality
in favor of high-skilled workers. However, applied to increased trade with developing countries
(low-skilled abundant), it would predict reduction of high-skilled technological-knowledge bias
and, thus, of the skilled premium. Moreover, this literature contradicts the dominant literature
on scale effects since Jones (1995a, b). In turn, the trade explanation (e. g., Wood, 1998)
depends on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, i.e., a decline in the relative price of the imported
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In case of developing countries, Zhu and Trefler (2005) observe an increase of the skill premium in Hong Kong,
India, Thailand and Uruguay during the early 1990s. Avalos and Savvides (2006) report an increase in wage inequality
in Latin America and East Asia between the mid 1970s and the mid 1990s. Brainerd (1998) finds evidence that the
wage differential between the 90th and 10th wage percentiles widened in Russia during the first half of the 1990s.
2 In case of developed countries, Nickell and Bell (1996) and Acemoglu (2003), for example, suggest a generic
change in wage inequality in favor of low-skilled labor in the late 1990s.
In case of developing countries, Robertson (2004) detects that wage differential between the 90th and 10th wage
percentiles decreased in Mexico between 1994 and 2004, and Zhu and Trefler (2005) show evidence that identical
developments occurred in countries such as Bolivia, South Korea and Philippines.
3 Some of all these findings are also confirmed by Juhn et al. (1993) and Card and DiNardo (2002), among others.
4 Without relevant international trade, Northern results cease to be reflected in the South.
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good must reduce the return of the factor that is used intensively in its production. However,
applied to the developing country it would only predict a reduction of the skilled premium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the economic structure and the
resulting international general equilibrium. Section 3 focuses, first, on the definition of the GPT
and of its diffusion process and, then, simulates its implications for the path of intra and inter-
country wage inequality. Some concluding remarks are presented in section 4.
II. Economic Structure
Each economy produces final goods in perfect competition and intermediate goods under
monopolistic competition. R&D activities, when successful, result in innovations (in the North)
and imitations (in the South) that are used by the intermediate-goods sector, as in Romer
(1990). Labor and quality-adjusted intermediate goods are the inputs of final goods. The
fraction of the aggregate final good that is not consumed is, in turn, used in the production of
intermediate goods and in R&D.
1. Domestic Product and Factor Markets
Following Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Afonso (2006), each final good ̶ indexed
by n ∈0, 1 ̶ is produced by one of two substitute technologies ̶ Low- and High-
technology. Low (High) -technology combines, under constant returns to scale, low (high) -
skilled labor, L (H), with Low (High)-specific intermediate goods indexed by j ∈0, 1 . The
production function is:
5
Yn (t)=
A
J
0
(qk ( j, t) xn( j, t))
1
dj (1−n) Ln if n≤n(t)
A
1
J
(qk ( j, t) xn( j, t))
1
dj (n h Hn) if n>n(t)
, (1)
A is the level of productivity, determined by the countryʼs domestic institutions
(exogenously) and by the state of general-purpose technology (endogenously). It is assumed
that AS<AN (S and N for South and North, respectively) is the only North-South difference in
the parameters of the production function.
The integral terms are the contributions of quality-adjusted intermediate goods: x is the
quantity, q>1 is the (exogenous) size of each quality improvement, k(j, t) is the current quality
rung in intermediate good j, and 1−α is the aggregate intermediate-goods input share. In turn,
0<α<1 is the labor share and h>1 is an absolute advantage of high- over low-skilled labor;
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5 Hence, the production function features complementarity between inputs ̶ low (high) -skilled labor and Low
(High) -specific intermediate goods ̶ and substitutability between technologies ̶ Low- and High-technology. Its
flexibility is mainly useful for the analysis of causality from input levels to the direction of technological knowledge
and, therefore, to wage inequality.
In particular, the combination of inputs in each technology ̶ specific labor and specific quality-adjusted
intermediate goods ̶ under constant returns to scale is in line with other studies (e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001;
Afonso, 2006), since there is little empirical evidence of substantial decreasing/increasing returns (e.g., Burnside et al.,
1995).
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and the terms n and 1−n imply that L (H) has a comparative advantage in producing final
goods indexed by small (large) ns.
This production function combines complementarity between inputs with substitutability
between the two technologies. The optimal choice of technology is reflected in the equilibrium
threshold n, which results from profit maximization (by perfectly competitive final-goods
producers and by intermediate-goods monopolists) and full-employment equilibrium in factor
markets, given the supply of labor and the current state of technological knowledge,
n(t)=1+
QH(t) h H
QL(t) L 
1
2

1
, (2)
where QL(t)≡
J
0
qk ( j, t)
1
  dj and QH(t)≡
1
J
qk ( j, t)
1
  dj (3)
are aggregate quality indexes of the stocks of technological knowledge. The ratio
QH
QL
is an
appropriate measure of the technological-knowledge bias. Taking into consideration that the
aggregate or composite final good (numeraire) is obtained by integration over final goods,
6
Y(t)=
1
0
pn(t) Yn(t) dn=exp(−1)A
1
1−αq 
1

(QL(t)L)
1
2+(QH (t)hH )
1
2
2
, (4)
the threshold n can be implicitly expressed in terms of pL and pH, which are the price-indexes
of Low and High final goods, respectively,
pH (t)
pL (t)
= n(t)1−n(t) 

. (5)
Full-employment in the labor market, implicit in n, yields the following equilibrium skilled
premium, measuring intra-country wage inequality:
wH (t)
wL (t)
=QH (t) h LQL(t) H 
1
2
, (6)
where wm is the wage per unit of m-type labor, m=H, L.
Together, equations (2), (5) and (6) are useful in foreseeing the operation of the price
channel from the stocks (of labor and technological knowledge) to the flows of resources used
in R&D and to wage inequality. For example, in a country relatively H-abundant and (or) with
a large technological-knowledge bias, n is small, i.e., many final goods are produced with the
High technology and sold at a relatively low price. Profit opportunities in the production of
intermediate-goods used by the relatively high-priced Low technology final goods induce a
change in the direction of R&D against the technological-knowledge bias and in favor of low-
skilled wages.
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6 Thus, due to the terms n and 1−n in the production function (1), the composite final good (4) features constant
elasticity of substitution between the two technologies Low and High (e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Afonso,
2006).
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2. R&D Technology
The results of successful R&D are innovations in the North and imitations in the South,
owned and protected domestically, which improve the quality of intermediate goods and the
stocks of technological knowledge, while creatively destroying the profits from the previous
improvements (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
The probabilities of successful R&D are, in the North and South, respectively,
pbN (k, j, t)=yN ( j, t)⋅βN q
(1)1k ( j, t)⋅mN (t)

(7)
and
pbS (k, j, t)=yS ( j, t)⋅βS q
(1)1k ( j, t)Q(t)⋅mS (t)

⋅Qm(t)
Qm(t)
, (8)
where
(i) yi( j, t), i=N, S, is the flow of country i ʼs final-good resources devoted to R&D in j;
(ii) βN q
(1)1k ( j, t), βN>0, is the Northʼs net cost of the increasing complexity of quality
improvements (net of the positive effect of accumulated public knowledge), as in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 7); because the levels of accumulated public knowledge are different,
this net cost in the South is adjusted by the relative m-specific technological knowledge of the
South, defined as Qm(t)≡
Qm, S (t)
Qm(t)
∈0, 1; in addition, βS>βN means that the cost of
complexity, for each k, is smaller in the case of imitation.
(iii) mi , m=L, H and ξ>0, is the adverse effect of market size, measured by the relevant
labor, assuming, as suggested by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), that the costs of
introducing new quality intermediate goods and replacing old ones are proportional to the size
of the market.
(iv) Qm(t)
Qm(t)
, σ>0, is a catching-up function, reflecting a decreasing advantage of
technological-knowledge backwardness, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997); the size of σ
affects how quickly the advantage of backwardness decreases with Qm.
3. International Trade and Limit Pricing of Intermediate Goods
It is considered that the North and South freely trade intermediate goods only, while final
goods and the other factors of production are internationally immobile. Resulting either directly
from the latest innovation or indirectly through cheaper imitation of the latest innovation,
internationally traded intermediate goods embody the state-of-the-art technological knowledge
accumulated in the North, Qm . This is the technological knowledge available to Southern
producers of intermediate goods, which is higher than the Southʼs domestic technological
knowledge, Qm, S, because at each point in time not all innovations have been imitated yet.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 12), it is assumed that limit pricing by each
leading monopolist is optimal. And, in order to generate production and exports of some
intermediate goods by the South, it is assumed that the marginal cost of producing final goods
is lower in the South. As the aggregate final good is the input to the production of intermediate
goods, the marginal cost advantage implies that when producing in the same quality rung, a
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [December
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Southern producer is able to underprice its Northern competitor.
The dynamics of competitive advantage in each intermediate good depends crucially on the
dynamics of innovations and imitations and, thus, it is endogenous. Figure 1 illustrates a
possible path of the technological knowledge in an intermediate good. At ta a Northern
producer innovates, capturing the entire international market until tb, when another Northern
producer innovates and steals the entire business. At t c a Southern producer imitates
successfully, stealing, in turn, the entire business (due to the marginal cost advantage prevailing
in the South) until the next innovation occurs at td . In this particular intermediate good,
between t c and td, the Southʼs domestic technological knowledge equals the technological
knowledge internationally available, while between ta and t c and after td it is smaller.
Due to the different levels of productivity, international immobility of labor and the limited
substitutability between the two types of labor (owing to the complementarity with sets of
intermediate goods), international trade is not sufficient to equalize wages neither intra- nor
inter-country.
As for intra-country differences in wages, equation (6) applied to the North and South with
trade of intermediate goods shows that relative wages depend on relative labor endowments.
Assuming that the North is relatively H abundant, i.e.,
HN
LN
>
HS
LS
, (9)
the following inequality holds:
7
wH, N
wL, N
=QH h LNQL HN 
1
2
<
wH, S
wL, S
=QH h LSQL HS 
1
2
. (10)
Inter-country wage inequality, in turn, depends crucially on exogenous productivity
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7 Note that since in autarky the relevant technological knowledge is the domestic one instead of the internationally
available, the Southʼs wage premium under autarky
wH, S
wL, S pretrade=
QH, S h LS
QL, S HS 
1
2
differs from the one in equation (10).
FIG. 1. PATH OF TECHNOLOGICAL-KNOWLEDGE IN THE INTERMEDIATE GOOD j
qk
0 ta tb tc td
qk0+3
qk0+2
qk0+1
qk0
North and
internationally
available
South
Time
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differences,
wm, S
wm, N
= pm, S ASpm, N AN 
1

. (11)
Wages are lower in the South if, as assumed, AS<AN and differences in prices of final goods
are of second order.
4. General Equilibrium
The equilibrium relationships for given states of aggregate resources allocation, technolog-
ical knowledge and labor are derived above. For labor is assumed, as a baseline, constant
exogenous endowments according to (9).
Concerning technological knowledge, its accumulation is largely driven by both probabil-
ities of successful R&D. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), the incentive to invest in
R&D relies on the expected amount of profits, which depend directly on the probability of
success and indirectly on the probability of success by the competitors. For example, the
current value that a monopolist producer of intermediate good j in the South attaches to a
domestically patented imitation of the state-of-the-art quality is given by:
VS (k, j, t)=
ΠS(k, j, t)
rS(t)+pbN (k, j, t)
, (12)
where Π is the monopolistʼs instantaneous profit and r is the market interest rate. The presence
of pbN (k, j, t) in the expression occurs because the expected duration of profits for the Southern
monopolist competing in the international market depends on the probability of a successful
innovation (in the North). This example corresponds to the period between t c and td in Figure 1,
above. In general, even though patents are non-tradable internationally, trade of intermediate
goods alone establishes the interaction between R&D activities in the North and South.
Since intermediate goods are demanded by producers of final goods in both countries,
monopolistʼs profits are sensitive to the size of both markets. Due to complementarity, market
size is appropriately measured by the specific labor; for instance, the profits at time t of a
Southern monopolist producer of a H-specific intermediate good are
ΠH, S (k, j, t)=h(1−α)
1
qk( j, t) (1)
1
(1−MCS)⋅
⋅HS AS pH, S(t)
1
+HN AN pH, N (t)
1
, (13)
where MCS<1 is the exogenous marginal cost of final goods in the South.
The positive influence of the market size on profits, and thus on R&D incentives, contrasts
with its adverse effect through the increasing cost of introducing new goods in the market, as
defined above in (7 and 8)-(iii): the first effect dominates if ξ<1, implying a bias in R&D in
favor of the more abundant type of labor; whereas the two effects cancel each other out when
ξ=1 and, in this last case, scale effects are negligible and, therefore, the bias mechanism relies
only on the price channel.
The demand-side allocation of aggregate resources, between consumption and savings,
closes the general equilibrium determination: consumers split the aggregate final good into
consumption and savings, which, in turn, are allocated between production of intermediate
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [December
一橋ジャーナル（経済）54−2
210
04経済54-2_Afonso_3K.mcd  Page 9 13/09/09 13:13  v5.51
goods and R&D. Thus, savings consist of accumulation of financial assets, with return r, in the
form of ownership (non-tradable internationally) of the firms that produce intermediate goods.
The value of these firms, in turn, is determined by the value of patents in use. For simplicity it
is considered that consumption-savings choices are independent of individualsʼ skills (low or
high) and country. Therefore, considering a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(CIES) instantaneous utility function, the consumption path optimally chosen by the single
representative individual is given by the Euler equation
c⋅ (t)
c(t)
=
r(t)−ρ
θ
, (14)
where θ>0 is the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ρ>0 is the constant
discount rate of utility.
The dynamic general equilibrium resulting from optimal decentralized behavior can be
described by the path of the state of both types of domestic technological knowledge towards
the steady state. The full solution requires numerical methods, which are used to describe,
below, the dynamics following a GPT (baseline parameter values and initial conditions are in
the appendix). However, in particular, the steady-state growth rate, g (assumed positive),
common to both types of technological knowledge and to both countries,
g=
Q
⋅
m
Qm

=
Q
⋅
m, S
Qm, S

=
r−ρ
θ
, (15)
can be derived analytically. The steady state given by (15) implies constant technological-
knowledge bias and constant inter-country gaps. During transition to the steady state, though,
interest rates and technological-knowledge growth differ between countries, since assets are
non-tradable internationally.
III. The Path and Consequences of a GPT
The genesis of a GPT is modeled as a particular innovation in one of the Northern final-
goods technologies. This innovation is manifested as a positive permanent shock to exogenous
productivity not only of that particular technology but also of the entire economy. Part of the
additional resources available after that shock increase investment in R&D thereby accelerating
the spread of the GPT, first to the other technology in the North an then to the South. During
this process the direction of technological knowledge changes, affecting wage inequality.
1. Genesis and Diffusion of a GPT
The innovation that triggers the shock in productivity arises in one of the final-goods
technologies in the North when the respective aggregate quality index ̶ Qm ̶ endogenously
reaches an exogenous threshold Q . In the steady-state path, according to (15), both Qs are
growing at the same positive rate, hence both are able to eventually reach Q. It is assumed that
QH (t)>Q

L (t)>Q

H, S(t)>Q

L, S (t), (16)
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so that the threshold is first reached by the H-technology in the North and so on, as described
in Figure 2.
Each shock in productivity ̶ ε>0 ̶, (i) temporarily affects the absolute advantage of
the type of labor that complements the specific technology in which the GPT arises and (ii)
shifts A permanently, in accordance to its general purpose character. In line with the sequence
in Figure 2, the following definitions, referring to parameters in the production function (1) are
useful:
in the North: ln h=ln h+ε if QL<Q⩽QHln h otherwise (17)
in the South: ln h=ln h+ε if QL, S<Q⩽QH, Sln h otherwise
in the North: 
ln AN if QH<Q
ln AN=ln AN+ε if QL<Q⩽QH
ln AN=ln AN+ε if QL⩾Q
(18)
in the South: 
ln AS if QH, S<Q
ln AS=ln AS+ε if QL, S<Q⩽QH, S
ln AS=ln AS+ε if QL, S⩾Q
Improvements in productivity at t0, when QH reaches Q, release resources that become
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FIG. 2. GPT DIFFUSION AND DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
Pre-GPT steady state
New GPT ariscs in H-
technology in the North
New GPT spreads to the
 L-technology in the North
New GPT spreads to the
H-technology in the Sorth
New GPT spreads to the
 L-technology in the Sorth
Towards the new GPT 
steady state
Steps of GPT diffusion Domestic technological knowledge
QL,S < QH,S < QL < QH < Q
t0
t1
t2
t3
QL,S < QH,S < QL < QH < Q
QL,S < QH,S < QL = Q < QH
QL,S < QH,S = Q < QL < QH
QL,S = Q < QH,S < QL < QH
Q < QL,S < QH,S < QL < QH
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partly available to investment in R&D activities directed to both technologies, thereby
increasing probabilities of success, which accelerates not only QH but also QL, bringing forward
t1 . In turn, these higher aggregate quality (or technological knowledge) indexes, available
internationally through trade, benefit the South, also from the outset (even before t2), through a
similar mechanism. Indeed, higher Northern aggregate quality indexes improve productivity,
releasing resources for imitative R&D, and thereby accelerating domestic technological
knowledge. Consequently, the acceleration brings forward the introduction of the GPT at t2 and
then t3.
The process of GPT emergence and diffusion using numerical computation of transitional
dynamics is simulated with the calibration presented in the appendix. Table 1 depicts,
qualitatively, the changes in the growth of the technological knowledge indexes over the entire
period of diffusion of the GPT. Starting from a steady state, with growth according to (15), the
differentiated growth rates following the new GPT depend on the phase of the diffusion process.
The larger arrow in the growth of QH between t0 and t1 means that the resources released
by the improvements in productivity in the North (h>h and AN>AN) are asymmetrically
allocated in R&D. In fact, due to the temporary increase in the absolute advantage of high-
skilled labor (h>h), profits of the complementary intermediate-goods producers increase more,
thereby stimulating allocation of resources to H -specific R&D. As a result, the probability of
successful H -specific innovations increases. After t1, once the GPT spreads within the North,
the temporary increase in h vanishes, reverting the allocation bias, while more resources are
released by a new increase in overall productivity (AN>AN).
As long as the GPT does not spread into the South, the correspondent arrows are smaller,
while asymmetry comes from the differentiated catching-up magnitudes ̶ the advantage of
backwardness becomes relatively stronger first in High and then in Low technological
knowledge. Then, when the GPT spreads internationally (at t2 and t3), the differences in growth
rates revert in favor of the South through the same type of mechanisms experienced by the
North at t0 and t1. However, growth in the North still benefits from the increases in Southern
productivity: the positive effect that higher demand (by Southern final-goods producers) for
intermediate goods has on innovations more than offsets the business-stealing effect of increased
imitation.
At the end of the process of diffusion of the GPT, after the transitional dynamics to the
new steady state, the resulting world growth rate has been enhanced by the successive
productivity improvements. From (15), it is clear that this higher steady-state growth rate
reflects a higher interest rate, which corresponds to a higher return from assets (patents in use)
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that have become more valuable.
2. Implications on the Direction of Technological Knowledge and Wage Inequality
The differentiated changes in growth qualitatively described in table 1 result in
differentiated phases of the direction of technological knowledge following the emergence of
the GPT, as shown in Figure 3.
8
At the end of the diffusion process the temporarily higher
absolute advantage of the technology where the GPT first emerges generates a permanent bias:
the direction of the new steady-state technological knowledge is H-biased relatively to the pre-
GPT steady state.
Due to complementarity of inputs in the production of final goods (1), the direction of
technological knowledge, together with the changes in productivity, determines the relative
demand for each type of labor and, consequently, the relative wage in each country.
Plugging the changes in the absolute advantage of high-skilled labor ̶ as defined in (18)
̶ into the equilibrium equation (6), above, the level of the high-skilled premium jumps
upwards at t0 in the North and at t2 in the South and downwards at t1 and t3. In turn, the high-
skilled premium growth, with constant labor endowments, depends exclusively on the growth of
the technological-knowledge bias,
gwH, N
wL, N
=g wH, S
wL, S
=
1
2
gQH
QL
. (19)
This mechanism, through which the emergence and diffusion of the GPT influence intra-
country wage inequality, generates the phases on the bottom graph of Figure 4. Notably, under
international trade, whereas the succession of jumps depends on the timings of domestic
diffusion, the growth of relative wages in the South is fully affected at the time of emergence of
the GPT in the North.
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8 Recall that with free trade of intermediate goods the technological knowledge embodied in intermediate goods used
in both countries is QL and QH, even though the domestic levels QL, S and QH, S are relevant for the timing of GPT
adoption in the South.
FIG. 3. TECHNOLOGICAL-KNOWLEDGE GAP
t0 t1 t2 t3 Time
QH
QL
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The recent and early twentieth-century evidence on intra-country wage inequality can
indeed be accommodated by the proposed mechanism:
• Following the introduction and diffusion of computers (a new GPT), the empirical
evidence detects an increase in the skill premium in developed countries (e.g., Machin
and Van Reenen, 1998; Berman et al., 1998) and in developing countries (e.g., Zhu and
Trefler, 2005; Avalos and Savvides, 2006), during the 1980s and the early 1990s.
Furthermore, in line with the end of the diffusion process, empirical evidence also
indicates a decrease in developed countries (e. g., Nickell and Bell, 1996; Acemoglu,
2003) and in developing countries (e.g., Robertson, 2004; Zhu and Trefler, 2005).
• Earlier episodes in the twentieth-century also support the view that the introduction and
diffusion of GPT innovations favor skilled workers ̶ e.g., Goldin and Katz (1998), for
the effect of the electricity in the 1910s.
Moreover, our framework also provides an explanation for the skill-replacing technological
knowledge of the early nineteenth-century in (North) Britain:
9
low-skilled labor in factories
replaced skilled artisans (high-skilled labor). During this century, radical technological-
knowledge improvements have been concomitant with a large increase in the supply of low-
skilled labor, resulting from migration from villages and Ireland (e. g., Habakkuk, 1962;
Bairoch, 1988; Williamson, 1990). The increase in supply of low-skilled labor, L, dominated
the effect of the introduction (and diffusion) of new GPTs, which starts by affecting h in
production. Consequently, in our model with complementarity between inputs and substitutabil-
ity between technologies, the higher increase in L compared with the increase in h has affected
the direction of the technological knowledge such that the relative demand for low-skilled labor
has increased.
10
Still on the analysis of intra-country wage inequality, the direct effect of recent changes in
institutional features on wages is explicitly omitted:
11
thus, it is implicitly assumed that this
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9 Without relevant international trade, the results in the Northern (Britain) country cease to be reflected in Southern
countries.
10 In technical terms, it is as if, ceteris paribus, in relative terms h had decreased.
FIG. 4. INTRA-COUNTRY WAGE INEQUALITY
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effect is limited. In turn, institutional features can also be reflected in the absolute advantage of
high over low-skilled labor in production. As a result, in our framework, changes in
institutional features affect the path of technological knowledge (demand of labor and wages)
through the same channel as the use of a new GPT.
Since international trade equalizes the growth of relative wages, the changes in inter-
country wage inequality along the process of diffusion, depicted in Figure 5, are determined
only by the GPT productivity shocks defined above in (17) and (18). The transmission of those
shocks to inter-country relative wages is derived from the conjunction of equilibrium equations
(2), (5) and (11): the latter shows how inter-country wage inequality depends on the relative
overall productivity (ASAN) and on relative prices of final goods; (5) shows that the prices of
final goods, in turn, depend on the threshold final good; and, finally, (2) indicates that the
threshold final good in each country changes with h . At t0, for example, both high and low-
skilled relative inter-country wages are affected by the increase in the relative overall
productivity in the North (AS AN<ASAN) and the high-skilled relative wage is, in addition,
affected by the temporary increase in h in the North.
IV. Concluding Remarks
A process of emergence and intra- and inter-country diffusion of a new GPT has been
simulated in a dynamic general-equilibrium framework where growth is driven by
Schumpeterian-R&D applied to intermediate goods that complement either high- or low-skilled
labor in the production of final goods. A crucial result of this complementarity is that the
direction of technological knowledge determines the path of intra-country wage inequality.
Under free trade of intermediate goods, this result applies internationally.
In particular, two stylized countries, one (North, where R&D is innovative and skilled-
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11 In particular, changes in labor market institutions (e.g., labor market unions) and in organizational change, which
may have decreased the wages of low-skilled workers (e.g., Freeman, 1991; DiNardo et al., 1995; Lee, 1999; Kremer
and Maskin, 1999; Autor et al., 2003).
FIG. 5. INTER-COUNTRY WAGE INEQUALITY
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labor is relatively abundant) more developed than the other (South, where R&D is imitative),
are considered. The GPT is modeled as a particular innovation in the North that is a positive
permanent shock to the productivity not only of that particular technology but also of the entire
economy. Additional resources available after that shock increase investment in R&D thereby
accelerating, from the outset, the spread of the GPT to other technologies, first in the North an
then in the South. During the diffusion process the direction of technological knowledge
changes successively, affecting wage inequality. If the GPT emerges in a high-skilled
technology, the relative demand for high-skilled labor increases, raising the high-skilled
premium until the GPT starts spreading to the other technologies.
Since under trade of intermediate goods the direction of technological knowledge that
prevails internationally results from innovative R&D, the growth of relative wages in the South
is fully affected from the outset (at the time of emergence of the GPT in the North), whereas
there are successive discrete changes in levels that depend on the timings of domestic diffusion.
Hence, the path of the technological-knowledge bias, following the emergence of the GPT,
determines different phases for the skill premium in both type of countries. These phases are
able to accommodate the historical reality of the wage-inequality path in many developed and
developing countries.
In the baseline calibration used, scale effects have been eliminated in favor of the price-
channel mechanism. However, the use of our model, which allows for simultaneous scale and
price effects, in future research should be able to assess the strength of the market-size channel
versus price channel.
Further details of the most recent fall in wages of low-skilled labor ̶ namely in
developing countries ̶ provide another promising extension for this research. This discussion
would have to consider detailed institutional features. In particular, it would be necessary to
explicitly consider the observed changes in labor market institutions (e.g., labor market unions)
over the past three decades. These changes may have decreased the wages of low-skilled
workers (e. g., Freeman, 1991; DiNardo et al., 1995; Lee, 1999). Moreover, it would be
necessary to explicitly consider the observed transformations in firmsʼ organizational change, or
maybe in the way that firms and workers match (e.g., Kremer and Maskin, 1999; Autor et al.,
2003). Implicitly, by omitting detailed institutional features, we consider that their direct effect
on wages is limited and we conjecture that, such as the emergence of a GPT, their effect on
wages is reflected in the absolute advantage of high over low-skilled labor and, through this
channel, affects path of technological knowledge (demand of labor and wages).
APPENDIX: Baseline Parameter Calibration
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QH0 LN
α ρ
MCS
HS
βN
θ HN
σ Q
Parameter Parameter
h
AS 1.301.051.00
1.201.501.50
ValueValueValue
QL0 ξ
QH0 ε
Parameter
QL0 LS
1.001.000.80
0.101.110.40
0.550.660.80
1.00
βS
0.791.20
0.450.030.60
TABLE 2. BASELINE PARAMETER VALUES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS
AN
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Baseline parameter calibration follows our previous related work ̶ Afonso (2006) ̶ and initial
levels are set according to condition (9) and to pre-GPT steady-state equilibrium.
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